Guernsey Legal Resources

2 For the purposes of this decision, I take the view that it suffices to say that the relevant legislation is the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Guernsey) Law 1957. This enables, subject to various safeguards, judgments of superior courts outside the Bailiwick to be registered and enforced within this jurisdiction. The relevant courts in England and Wales are the “House of Lords, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice” (specified in the Schedule to the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Amendment) Ordinance 1991, made under s.3 of the 1957 Law). A county court therefore does not fall within the ambit of this definition.

3 The problem (as was very properly pointed out in the original application) is an authority from the Royal Court of Jersey—In re Hardwick (2). It should be noted that the other Islands, i.e. Jersey and the Isle of Man, have legislation in identical terms to Guernsey. In Hardwick, the Royal Court (Bailhache, Bailiff) held that a judgment originally made in the Leeds County Court and transferred to the High Court for the purpose of execution was not the judgment of “a superior court” under art. 3(1) of the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Jersey) Law 1960. The transfer of the judgment from the Leeds County Court to the High Court was (1995 JLR at 249) “only for a specific and internal purpose, that is to say for the purpose of execution.” In addition, the legislation referred to “the original court,” which “in relation to any judgment means the court by which the judgment was given” (art. 2(1) of the 1960 Law). The court held that the judgment had been given by the county court. Accordingly, the original order of the Deputy Judicial Greffier was set aside and the order could not properly be registered in Jersey. This case, although not binding upon the Guernsey Royal Court, is plainly of persuasive authority and has to be considered respectfully. It was that decision, allied to a reading of the legislation, which caused doubts in my mind.

4 The additional submissions reveal a case from the Isle of Man, Video Vision Broadcast v. Stapleford Flying Club Ltd. (3). This decision was to the opposite effect of Hardwick, and I am urged to apply it. It should be noted that it is an appellate judgment of the Staff of Government Division, upholding the Deemster’s decision in the Common Law Division. It was

“It is quite simply a very suitable and appropriate verb to describe the method of the declaring of a judgment, and so long as the document which arrives in the Island from another country can be labelled correctly and legally as a judgment issued by the superior court, that seems to me to be sufficient for the purposes of the 1968 Act.”

5 These words were quoted and approved in the judgment of Hytner, J.A. (1990–92 MLR at 240). The conclusion of that judgment was (ibid., at 242):

“Having considered the matter with anxious care, we have come to the conclusion that a construction which meant that a judgment transferred from the county court to the High Court in England and becoming for all purposes of enforcement a High Court judgment, entitled “In the High Court of Justice in England,” an interpretation saying that that was not, for the purposes of Manx legislation relating to enforcement, a judgment of the High Court in England would be wrong.”

“IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

MASTER ROSE

CLAIM NO. HQ09X00529.”

7 It refers to a judgment obtained in the Mayor’s & City of London Court (“MCLC”). That court transferred the action to the High Court, by order dated February 4th, 2009, for the purposes of reciprocal enforcement. The Master signed the certificate on March 13th, 2009. The MCLC’s documents are all stamped with its own seal and also that of the Supreme Court. As indicated, there is a High Court action number assigned. To all intents and purposes, there is no appreciable difference between this set of circumstances and those set out in the Jersey and Isle of Man cases. The amount we are concerned with is £42,474.84.

8 In the Hardwick case (2), reference was made to s.42 of the County Courts Act 1984. Sub-section (5)(b) states that where a county court judgment or order is transferred to the High Court for the purpose of enforcement, it shall be treated as a judgment or order of the High Court “for all purposes.” Bailhache, Bailiff stated (ibid., at 249) that the argument that this had transformed the county court judgment into a High Court judgment “may well be right as a matter of English law but we are concerned with the question of whether such a judgment can be registered in Jersey under the 1960 Law.” In my respectful judgment, more deference should have been afforded to the wording of the English statute, which, although a matter of English law, cannot be brushed aside.

9 However, it suffices for the purpose of this decision to state that I prefer the Isle of Man approach. It is comforting to know that this was a decision on appeal, and it might be thought possible that the Jersey case would have been augmented had the decision been cited in argument. The document I am asked to consider is headed “IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE,” has an action number, and is stamped with the seal of the Supreme Court. Some further comfort can be reaped from observations of Southwell, J.A. in the Guernsey case of Flightlease Holdings (Guernsey) Ltd. v. Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd. (1). In that judgment is found the conclusion (2009–10 GLR 38, at para. 91(7)) that “Guernsey, as a significant centre for financial services of many kinds, needs to develop its commercial laws in ways which provide just solutions in the relatively complex situations which arise . . .”

10 This was a liquidation matter, but the principle is germane in this application. It seems to me preferable to follow the Isle of Man approach and reject the somewhat mechanistic decision in the Jersey case. This has the added virtue, always welcome in civil matters, of common sense.

11 I agree with the submissions of the judgment creditor, and the application to register the judgment is granted. The safeguards in the legislation exist, should the judgment debtor wish to invoke them. For the sake of completeness, notice of the registration may be served as set out in the application. Counsel is requested to prepare a draft order in accordance with this decision.

12 Costs are reserved until 21 days from the date of service of notice of the registration. If an application is made to set aside the registration in that period, costs will be considered in the light of any decision made on such an application; if no such application is made, then the question of costs is to be referred to me in writing.