Guernsey Legal Resources

  The variation of a consent order for financial provision after judicial separation should not follow lines radically different from those taken by the parties themselves in reaching agreement on the terms of the original order (Boylan v. Boylan, [1988] 1 FLR 282, followed). The fact that they agreed that certain arrangements were reasonable as between themselves is strong evidence that they were in fact reasonable unless (a) the agreement was unfairly procured or made under a misapprehension, (b) circumstances have changed in some material respect, or (c) there is strong evidence to the effect that the terms of the agreement in fact operate unreasonably. In such cases, a variation will be made. Any variation will, however, have to consider whether one of the parties has organized his or her affairs on the basis of the original agreement, so as to make some possible variations unfair (A v. A, C.A., Civil App. No. 340, April 21st, 2004, unreported, dicta of Sumption, J.A. applied).

  If the consent order involved provision for the maintenance of the children of the marriage, the court considering variation should always bear in mind that their welfare is the “first consideration.” Broadly speaking, a person having an obligation to provide reasonable maintenance for his children has a responsibility to order his financial affairs with due regard to meeting this obligation, and then to meeting his other reasonable financial obligations.