Guernsey Law Reports 2007–08 GLR 410
P. BROOKS, J.G. BROOKS and G.R. BROOKS v. ALLEN (as Executrix of J. BROOKS), BILLEN and TAYLOR
ROYAL COURT (Brelsford, Lieut. Bailiff): August 28th, 2008
Succession—wills—testamentary capacity—burden of proof—capacity normally presumed but if previous mental illness raises dispute or doubts about capacity, to be established affirmatively by person propounding will—heavier burden if evidence of previous mental illness—person propounding will to establish that will made after recovery from mental illness or during lucid interval
Three of the four children of the testatrix brought proceedings against the defendants (representing the estate and two of the beneficiaries under the testatrix’s will of personal estate) seeking to set aside the will for lack of testamentary capacity.
The testatrix had for some time suffered from ill-health, was an alcoholic and was under guardianship both at the time she made the will and when she died. She made two substantial bequests (to the second and third defendants) and gave the residue of her personal estate to her children in equal shares. The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory order that the defendants, as the persons propounding the will, establish that the testatrix had the requisite mental capacity to make the will.
They submitted that although the testatrix’s sanity at the time of making her will would normally have been presumed, since it had been questioned, the burden lay on the defendants, as the persons propounding the will, to prove that she had been of sound disposing mind when she made it.
The defendants submitted in reply that (a) although there might be a presumption of incapacity if the testatrix were under guardianship by reason of dementia, where as here the guardianship was occasioned by intoxication and prodigality, no such presumption arose; (b) the will could be challenged, however, if the testatrix were so deranged that she was unfit to choose the beneficiaries under her will, though this was not the case here; and (c) in any event, the court should first hear the full evidence on oath before it could determine whether the burden of establishing capacity had shifted to the propounder of the will.
Held, making the following ruling:
The law generally presumed capacity and no evidence was required to prove a testator’s sanity if it were not questioned. If any dispute or doubt
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existed as to testamentary capacity, however, the testator’s sanity would be treated as suspect and would have to be established affirmatively by the persons relying on the will. The burden of proof would be considerably increased if it appeared that the testator had previously been mentally ill and those persons would then have to show that it had been made either after recovery from that illness or during a lucid interval and was therefore valid. The initial burden in the present case therefore lay on the defendants to establish that the testatrix had the requisite mental capacity to make her will (paras. 6–10).
Cases cited:
(1) Davies v. Stirling, 1983 J.J. 77, referred to.
(2) Hoff v. Atherton, [2005] W.T.L.R. 99; [2004] All E.R. (D.) 314; [2004] EWCA Civ 1554, observations of Chadwick, L.J. applied.
(3) Trigg v. Crapp, 1984 J.J. 21, dicta of Ereaut, Bailiff applied.
P.T.R. Ferbrache for the plaintiffs;
The first defendant appeared in person;
R.I.C.E. Harris for the second defendant;
The third defendant did not appear and was not represented.
1 BRELSFORD, LIEUT. BAILIFF:
Introduction
On May 25th, 2006, the late Jennifer Bridget Elizabeth Mary Brooks (“the testatrix”), executed a will of personal estate in which she appointed Advocate Pauline Angela Allen (the first defendant) to be her sole executrix. By the said will the testatrix gave the sum of £100,000 to Karen Billen (the second defendant) “as a token of my love and gratitude for all that she has done for me” and £50,000 to June Taylor (the third defendant) “in recognition of the friendship of June and her husband Shirley.” The rest of her personal estate was to go to her four children in equal shares absolutely, provided that should any of her children predecease her leaving issue, such issue should take by representation and per stirpes absolutely. It is accepted that the testatrix suffered from ill health, was an alcoholic and that since May 15th, 2001 she had been under guardianship and so remained both when she gave instructions and signed her will. She was still under guardianship at the time of her death on March 26th, 2007.
2 Since her death, three of her children, Jason George Brooks, Philip Harvey Brooks and Gregory Robert Brooks (“the plaintiffs”), have commenced proceedings against the defendants seeking an order that the testatrix’s will be set aside “for want of testamentary capacity.” The present interlocutory application before the court is for an order that the burden of proof is upon the parties propounding the will (the defendants),
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to demonstrate that at the time the testatrix made her will she had the requisite mental capacity so to do.
3 Advocate Ferbrache, appearing for the plaintiffs, submitted that although it is presumed that a testator was sane at the time when he made his will, if the question of sanity is contested, the onus is on the person propounding the will to prove that the testator was of sound disposing mind at the time when he made his will. He drew my attention, inter alia, to the position under Jersey law, as held by Ereaut, Bailiff in Trigg v. Crapp (3) (1984 J.J. at 24):
“. . . [T]he proper rule is that it is the duty of the executors or any other person setting up a will to show that it is the act of a competent testator, and that therefore where, as here, there is a dispute as to the capacity of the testator, his testamentary capacity must be proved by the person setting up the will…”
4 Advocate Allen, the first defendant, submitted that there is little authority in Guernsey relating to testamentary capacity and what there is is contained in the text of Jeremie, An Essay on the Laws of Real Property in Guernsey (1841). Advocate Allen quoted Jeremie (op. cit., at 156) as stating that there may be a presumption of incapacity of a person under guardianship as a result of dementia but not when the person is under guardianship because of “intoxication and prodigality,” as a guardian is appointed in this case “for the purpose of securing him against want… not for that of depriving him of any civil right…” However, as Jeremie goes on to state (ibid.), this does not stop a person’s will being questioned if he becomes “so weak or deranged as to render him unfit to select the heir of his choice.”
5 Advocate Harris, appearing for the second defendant, also referred to the excerpt from Jeremie. He further argued that the court should first hear the full evidence on oath before it can determine whether the burden of establishing capacity has in fact shifted to the propounder of the will. He directed me to the case of Hoff v. Atherton (2), in which Chadwick, L.J. stated ([2005] W.T.L.R. 99, at para. [27]) that the burden of proving soundness of mind lies on those propounding the will in the light of all the evidence before the court.
Conclusion
6 It is correct that the burden of proof may shift from one party to another in the course of a case. Thus where it is admitted by those propounding the will that the deceased had previously suffered from incapacity at a period before the will was made, a presumption is raised against it, though not a conclusive one.
7 Once all the evidence has been given and is before the court, the
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burden or onus of proof is rarely decisive. The court must sift and evaluate that evidence and make its findings upon it (Davies v. Stirling (1)).
8 While, generally speaking, the law presumes capacity and no evidence is required to prove the testator’s sanity, if not questioned—
“. . . where any dispute or doubt exists as to the capacity of the testator, his testamentary capacity must be established and proved affirmatively. The issue of capacity is one of fact. The burden of proof of sanity is considerably increased when it appears that the testator had been subject to previous unsoundness of mind.”
(17(2) Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed. (Reissue), para. 314, at 176).
9 Once incapacity before the date of the will has been established, the burden lies on the party propounding the will to show that it was made after recovery or during a lucid interval and is therefore valid. “In such a case the will should be regarded with great distrust, and every presumption should in the first instance be made against it…” (loc. cit., para. 315, at 177).
10 At this juncture, therefore, for the above reasons, I find that the burden initially is upon the defendants as the parties propounding the will to demonstrate that at the time the testatrix made her will she had the requisite mental capacity to do so.
Ruling accordingly.
2009
Law Report
None
Guernsey Law Reports 2007–08 GLR 410