Guernsey Legal Resources

We have dealt with these cases together as the subject-matter is common. The first three appellants were dealt with together in the Magistrate’s Court on June 5th, 2008; Marshall on his own. The appeals raise questions in connection with the sentencing of persons for possession of Class A drugs on summary trial. We will do our best to issue what we consider is appropriate and, hopefully, useful guidance to the Magistrate’s Court.

  Bassford: possession of 2.5g. of cocaine, with a Guernsey street value of £250–£500;

  Larose: possession of 1.1g. of cocaine, with a Guernsey street value of £110–£220;

  Stuart: possession of 1.7g. of cocaine, with a Guernsey street value of £170–£340; and

  Marshall: possession of 1.47g. of cocaine, with a Guernsey street value of £140–£280 and possession of 2 Ecstasy tablets, with a street value of £20–£40.

  Bassford to 9 months’ imprisonment;

  Larose to 6 months’ imprisonment;

  Stuart to 8 months’ imprisonment; and

  Marshall to 7 months’ imprisonment and 2 weeks’ imprisonment concurrent (the latter not being the subject of an appeal).

The customary forfeiture/destruction orders were made.

4 The grounds of the appeals have been set out in extensive detail. In summary, it is suggested the custodial sentences were inappropriate and should be replaced by community punishments or, failing that, much reduced custodial terms.

5 This court starts, as indeed did the learned Magistrate, with the English guideline case of R. v. Aramah (2) for a basic statement of principle—a principle which, it should be noted, is not confined to heroin but applies to cocaine and other Class A drugs. Dealing with simple possession cases, Lord Lane, C.J. said (4 Cr. App. R. (S.) at 409):

“It is at this level that the circumstances of the individual offender become of much greater importance. Indeed the possible variety of considerations is so wide, including often those of a medical nature that we feel it impossible to lay down any practical guidelines. On the other hand, the maximum penalty for simple possession of class ‘A’ drugs is seven years’ imprisonment and/or a fine, and there will be very many cases where deprivation of liberty is both proper and expedient.”

6 But we need to consider, as did the Magistrate’s Court, the situation as it applies in Guernsey. We respectfully agree with the learned Magistrate’s observation:

“This court also reiterates that sentencing in Guernsey has traditionally been more severe than in England and I believe the same approach applies in Jersey. And finally, this court points out that just as the Royal Court deals severely with drug trafficking cases, this court will deal severely with those people who possess even very small amounts of Class A drugs; the starting point will always be considered as an immediate prison sentence.”

7 For larger-scale importation cases, we have the considered guidelines of the Court of Appeal in Richards v. Law Officers (3), which have been explained and filled out in succeeding cases. It is worthy of note that the Richards guidelines for 1–20g. of Class A drugs in powder form set out a sentencing band of 7–9 years’ imprisonment. Mercifully, but properly, the prosecution dealt with Bassford, Larose and Stuart for simple possession, even though the circumstances showed importation, and kept them in the lower court, where the maximum sentence is 12 months. These appellants may consider themselves fortunate.

8 The value of sentencing decisions, apart from guideline cases, especially from other jurisdictions, is rather limited. We observe that there is nothing in the sentences which is markedly inconsistent with English decisions. We must, however, reiterate that it is conditions in Guernsey, of which both the Magistrate’s Court and this court are only too well aware, that need to be taken into account. We also emphasize, as we never tire of doing, that sentencing is not a mathematical exercise wherein a quantity of drugs is fed into the computer and a result in years or months comes out. Each case varies and will be assessed individually. We pause to note that

9 We endorse the approach of the Magistrate based on what seem to us to be the very apt remarks found in Aramah (2) that we alluded to earlier. Cases of this type do not lend themselves to the detailed production of guidelines as in Richards (3). In our view, the starting point for possession of Class A drugs should be a custodial sentence, not a fine, the length of which will be determined by the individual factors in the case, including personal mitigation. The only cases where more leniency can be shown will be, in our judgment, offences concerning simple possession of infinitesimal amounts. Any other approach would be inconsistent with how sentencing for drugs cases has developed in recent years, particularly since the promulgation of the Richards guidelines. We wish to emphasize for the sake of completeness that none of the appellants was in possession of a minute quantity of cocaine; amounts ranged from 1.1g. to 2.5g. The important thing is the quantity and we see no material inconsistency in the views of Advocate Perry and Tracy Rear.

10 We have noted a considerable amount of mitigation advanced on behalf of each appellant, as did the Magistrate. It is sometimes forgotten that the purpose of sentencing is not to conduct an exercise based on the welfare and interests of defendants, but to act in the wider interests of justice. We cannot improve on the words of Carey, Bailiff in Richards that “misuse of drugs is one of the scourges of European society.” That is the simple truth we have to face and deal with very regularly.

11 In each of the cases now before the Royal Court, the court below assessed the voluminous mitigation with care. As the learned Magistrate said: “Against the effect on your lives, however, I have to balance the fact that Class A drugs themselves wreck lives.” We endorse this and have seen this time and time again.

12 It is necessary to bear this in mind when assessing the mitigation, however worthy it may be. When sentencing Marshall, the Magistrate observed: “I know that an immediate prison sentence will have a devastating effect on your business and on those closest to you, but these were matters you should have realized before you chose to buy these drugs.” This applies in effect to all the appellants.

13 The question for the Royal Court is whether the sentences passed were manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. In our view, they were indeed severe, but properly differentiated between the facts and mitigation of the individual cases. The consequences were certainly painful and