Guernsey Law Reports 2005–06 GLR 314
ADMINISTRATOR OF INCOME TAX v. CACHEMAR LIMITED
COURT OF APPEAL (Smith, Rokison and Steel, JJ.A.): January 31st, 2006
Income tax—deductions—“permissible management expenses”—“management” of investment company to be given broad construction in Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975, s.169—includes both making and executing management decisions but cost of acquiring or disposing of investments not permissible expense
The Administrator of Income Tax appealed to the Royal Court against the decision of the Guernsey Tax Tribunal that a sum of money was deductible from Cachemar Ltd.’s assessable income as “permissible management expenses” within the definition in s.169 of the Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975.
In January 1998, Cachemar Ltd., an investment company, entered into a discretionary management agreement with Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) Ltd., which granted Singer & Friedlander complete discretion in managing a portfolio of the respondent’s assets. The management tasks specified in the agreement included dealing in investments, the provision of nominee services, safe custody, collecting income and effecting administrative actions, in addition to providing valuations and statements of
2005–06 GLR 315
account. In return, the respondent agreed to pay fees and commissions to Singer & Friedlander; in the year of charge 2001, these totalled £14,994, which the respondent sought to deduct from its assessable income as “permissible management expenses” for the purposes of s.169 of the Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975.
The deduction was disallowed by the Administrator of Income Tax, but, on appeal, the Guernsey Tax Tribunal decided that the deduction was in fact permissible. The Administrator appealed to the Royal Court against the Tribunal’s decision, but the Royal Court agreed that the sum claimed constituted “permissible management expenses” and that it could therefore be deducted from Cachemar Ltd.’s assessable income. The decision of the Royal Court is reported at 2005–06 GLR 161.
On further appeal, the Administrator submitted that (a) the Royal Court had been wrong to adopt a broad construction of the phrase “permissible management expenses” and had not given the words their ordinary meaning, as the inclusion of the words “wholly and exclusively” in the definition of “permissible management expenses” in s.169 of the Law suggested that a restrictive definition should be applied, i.e. that the phrase should apply only to expenses incurred in the making of management-related decisions, or, alternatively, that it should only include the expenses necessary to ensure the corporate existence of the company, such as audit fees, sealing documents and filing fees; (b) the Royal Court should have distinguished between making managerial decisions and executing them, since its approach equated the computation of an investment company’s assessable income with that of an ordinary business when the Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975 had different schemes for the two; had it done this, it would have seen that some of the items of expenditure under the sum claimed as a deduction were not wholly and exclusively concerned with making managerial decisions and were therefore not deductible; and (c) the phrase “managing the company” should not be extended any further than to cover the fiscal imbalance created by deciding to use an investment management company rather than holding the investments directly.
Cachemar submitted in reply that (a) it was clear from the words in s.169 of the Law that the definition of “permissible management expenses” should encapsulate management in a broad sense; (b) all the items of expenditure that fell within the sum claimed as a deduction were “permissible management expenses,” since, under a broad definition of management, they were expended “wholly and exclusively for the purpose of managing the company”; (c) the exclusions in s.169 as to what constituted “permissible management expenses,” which were designed to ensure that investment companies which had invested in land or buildings in Guernsey did not receive double tax allowances in respect of claims for deductions made under s.13 (dealing with deductions for maintenance, repairs, insurance and management of buildings in certain circumstances) or s.162 (dealing with the deduction for permissible management expenses), would not have been necessary if the legislature had had in mind a narrow construction of management, and therefore it was correct
2005–06 GLR 316
that “permissible management expenses” should be construed broadly; and (d) the Royal Court’s conclusion that the sum claimed as a deduction was deductible should be upheld.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) The Royal Court had correctly concluded that the sum claimed was deductible as permissible management expenses. There was no evidence to suggest that the legislature had merely intended to allow “corporate acts of managing the company” (e.g. audit fees, sealing documents and filing fees) to be deductible; indeed, the use of the exclusions in the definition of “permissible management expenses” in s.169 clearly showed that the legislature had had in its mind a broad construction of management when it enacted the statute. “Managing” meant taking responsibility for the activities of the company and did not exclude the execution of decisions made. As an investment company’s activities were chiefly or exclusively concerned with making investments, it followed that expenditure wholly and exclusively for the purposes of managing such activities was—subject to the exclusions in s.169—deductible from the amount assessable for income tax (paras. 22–24; para. 31).
(2) The Royal Court’s broad interpretation of the definition of “permissible management expenses” did not equate the position of investment companies with that of ordinary businesses, but even if it had, it would not have altered the clear meaning of the relevant words in s.169 (para. 26).
(3) The Royal Court had correctly concluded that, since expenditure for the purposes of managing the activities of an investment company was not the same as expenditure on the purchase or disposal of its assets, the direct expenses of acquisition or disposal thereof were not deductible as “permissible management expenses.” Had these been included in the sum claimed as a deduction (which was not the case here), they would rightly have been disallowed. However, there was evidence to suggest that such expenses had not been included in the sum claimed. Given the broad interpretation of management required, all the items of expenditure in the list of “investment management fees” in the management agreement could be said to have been expended “wholly and exclusively for the purpose of managing the company.” The sum claimed was therefore deductible from the amount assessable for income tax (para. 11; para. 25; para. 32).
Cases cited:
(1) Atkinson (Inspector of Taxes) v. Camas PLC, [2003] EWHC 1600; on appeal, [2004] EWCA Civ 541, dicta of Carnwath, L.J. referred to.
(2) Sun Life Assur. Socy. v. Davidson, [1958] A.C. 184, dicta of Lord Reid applied.
Legislation construed:
Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975, s.2: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 3.
2005–06 GLR 317
s.13(1): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at para. 30.
s.17(1): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at para. 5.
s.18: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 8.
s.160: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 6.
s.162: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 7.
s.169: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 7.
R.J. McMahon, Crown Advocate, for the appellant;
P.T.R. Ferbrache for the respondent.
1 SMITH, J.A., delivering the judgment of the court:
Introduction
This appeal arises out of a decision of the Guernsey Tax Tribunal handed down on June 8th, 2004. That decision concerned an appeal by Cachemar Ltd., the respondent to this appeal (“the taxpayer”), against the refusal of the Administrator of Income Tax, the appellant, to allow a deduction from its income. The Tribunal found in favour of the taxpayer, and the Administrator, being dissatisfied by that determination as being erroneous in point of law, required the Tribunal to state and sign a case for submission to the Royal Court in accordance with s.80 of the Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975. The question of law arising on the case was heard and determined in the Royal Court by Talbot, Lieut. Bailiff. He found in favour of the taxpayer and the Administrator has appealed to the court. Having heard the arguments of both sides, advanced by Crown Advocate R.J. McMahon for the Administrator and Advocate P.T.R. Ferbrache for the taxpayer (to both of whom we are indebted), we indicated that we had decided to dismiss this appeal and that we would give our reasons at a later date. This we now do, and this is the judgment of the court.
The relevant statutory provisions
2 It is not disputed that the taxpayer is an “investment company” within the meaning of s.169 of the Law. In so far as material, that section defines an investment company as “a company which is resident in Guernsey . . . and whose activities consist wholly or mainly in the making of investments and the principal part of whose income is derived therefrom . . .”
3 Section 2 of the Law describes the four classes of income in respect of which tax is chargeable. These are:
“(1) income from businesses;
“(2) income from offices and employments;
“(3) income from the ownership of lands and buildings; and
2005–06 GLR 318
“(4) income from other sources . . .”
4 Section 7 deals with the computation of the amount of the profits of any business (i.e. class (1) of s.2 of the Law), and sub-s. (1) of that section provides that they “shall be computed in accordance with the ordinary commercial principles applicable to the computation of profits of that business.” Section 8 of the Law deals with income from offices and employments (i.e. class (2) of s.2) and ss. 6–16 deal with the assessment of income arising from the ownership of lands and buildings (i.e. class (3) of s.2). Of these, only s.13 has any bearing on this appeal and we set out the relevant sub-section at a later stage in this judgment when we come to consider it.
5 Section 17 of the Law, which deals with income from other sources (i.e. class (4) of s.2), is relevant, and the material part of sub-s. (1) reads as follows:
“The assessable income from sources not covered by any of sections seven, eight or nine of this Law shall be the income arising or accruing from such sources after deduction of any expenditure not being:
. . .
(b) in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses,
wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of earning such income.”
6 Part XIV of the Law contains what are described as “Special Provisions as to Investment Companies Resident in Guernsey and to Unit Trust Schemes.” Section 160 reads:
“For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that, subject as hereinafter provided in relation to the expenses of management of investment companies, the assessable income arising or accruing to an investment company from the ownership of any land and any building situate in Guernsey shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of sections nine to sixteen of this Law, and the assessable income arising or accruing from any other investment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of section seventeen of this Law.”
7 Section 162 of the Law provides that—
“a deduction from the income arising or accruing to an investment company for any year of charge may be permitted by the Administrator in respect of sums disbursed as permissible management expenses in the year of computation if a claim for the deduction is made [in the manner prescribed by that section.]”
2005–06 GLR 319
In s.169 of the Law, the phrase “permissible management expenses” in the case of an investment company is defined as meaning—
“. . . such items of expenditure as are laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of managing the company as would be permissible deductions in accordance with such provisions of this Law as relate to the computation of the profits of a business if the profits of the company fell to be computed in accordance with those provisions, but does not include—
(a) any item of expenditure which may be deducted or taken into account under any provision of this Law which does not relate specifically to expenses of management, or
(b) any expense of management which may be taken into account for the purpose of determining the amount of any additional deduction which may be claimable under the provisions of section thirteen of this Law.”
8 Section 18 of the Law provides that “the onus of proof that any expenditure is an allowable deduction from profits or income for the purpose of this Law shall be upon the person claiming so to deduct.”
The taxpayer’s claim
9 The taxpayer claimed to be entitled to deduct as permissible management expenses within the meaning of s.169 of the Law “investment management fees,” totalling £14,944, which it had paid during the year of charge to an Isle of Man company on foot of a written “investment management agreement.” Under it, the Isle of Man company managed the portfolio of assets (including uninvested cash) entrusted to it by the taxpayer (described as “the Fund”), and its management fee (singular in the agreement) was calculable, and in the instant case was calculated, by the application to the value of the Fund of a sliding scale of percentages.
The role of the Isle of Man company
10 The Tribunal had before it a “statement of agreed background facts” which had a number of documents incorporated into it by reference, including correspondence between the Administrator and the Guernsey Society of Chartered and Certified Accountants, which had written to him on behalf of the taxpayer and other taxpayers with similar claims. It also heard evidence from a director of the taxpayer company. It made its decision on the basis that the facts were not in dispute. It is worth setting out two passages from the case which describe the role of the Isle of Man company and which lay at the heart of the taxpayer’s appeal to the Tribunal and the Tribunal’s decision.
2005–06 GLR 320
11 The first passage summarized the evidence of the director of the taxpayer company in the following terms:
“(i) [The Isle of Man company] had always managed the [taxpayer’s] investment activities and the costs of this were allowed prior to 2001. [The Isle of Man company] selects the portfolio and buys and sells shares, collects accounts for dividends and submits accounts. One of its representatives makes occasional visits to Guernsey to get the feel of the shareholders’ requirements. [The Isle of Man company] in fact does everything to ensure an easy life for the directors. The commissions charged on the purchase of shares are included within the price of the shares. The management fee of £14,944 does not include acquisition costs. The investment management expenses were revenue in the hands of [the Isle of Man company].
(ii) The instructions to [the Isle of Man company] were to maintain a balanced portfolio and the revenue has been fairly static. The management fee is based on the capital value of the assets. Dividends were not paid by the [taxpayer], but the beneficial owner received income through a loan account. No fees were charged for specific transactions other than through the commissions.”
12 The second passage reads as follows:
“The agreement specifies [the tasks of the Isle of Man company] as discretionary investment management, including dealing in investments, the provision of nominee services, safe custody and ancillary services including the settlement of transactions, the collection of income and the effecting of administrative actions, together with the provision of valuations and statements of account.”
The decision of the Tribunal and the question for the determination of the court
13 On the basis of the material before it, the Tribunal found that the fees of £14,994 paid by the taxpayer to the Isle of Man company during the year of charge were permissible management expenses in accordance with the Law. The question for the determination of the Royal Court was whether the Tribunal was correct in law in concluding that the management fees claimed by the taxpayer were deductible from its income for the year of charge in question and were permissible management expenses in accordance with the Law.
The decision of the Royal Court
14 The Lieutenant Bailiff largely concurred with the Tribunal’s reasoning, agreed with the conclusion it reached and answered the question in the affirmative. He thought that the words “laid out or expended wholly
2005–06 GLR 321
and exclusively for the purpose of managing the company” in s.169 of the Law comprehended management in a broad sense, and not in a limited sense. Later in his judgment, after quoting the Tribunal’s description of the tasks specified in the agreement (see para. 12), he said the following (2005–06 GLR 161, at para. 59):
“The Tribunal concluded that such tasks, in its view, fell within a broad definition of management as regards a portfolio of investments, and, taking into account the fact that commission was earned separately on transactions and charged as part of the cost of investments and changes of investment, concluded that the expenses of the management fees were wholly and exclusively expenses of management of the company and allowed the claim for deductions made by the company. In my judgment, the reasoning of the Tribunal in reaching such a conclusion was, to a large part, right. I agree with the conclusion which it reached.”
The grounds of appeal
15 The grounds of appeal are set out in the Administrator’s notice of appeal, are commendably succinct and read as follows:
“The learned Lieutenant Bailiff erred in law in concluding that the investment management expenses of £14,994 claimed by the respondent as a lawful deduction from its income in respect of the year of charge 2001 were permissible management expenses because he gave the phrase ‘permissible management expenses’ a wider meaning than he should have and, in doing so, failed to have proper regard to special regime [sic] for taxing resident investment companies under Part XIV of the Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975, as amended, which distinguishes them from businesses.”
The Adminstrator’s arguments in this court
16 Mr. McMahon, who appeared for the Administrator not only before us but also before the Tribunal and the Royal Court, provided a written skeleton argument and developed the points in it orally before us. We summarize these, we hope accurately, as follows:
(a) the Lieutenant Bailiff was wrong to adopt a broad construction of the phrase “permissible management expenses” in s.169 of the Law;
(b) the Lieutenant Bailiff had paid too much regard to construing “managing” and its cognate “management” separately from the context of the words in the phrase “managing the company”;
(c) the phrase “managing the company” does not go further than redressing the fiscal imbalance brought about by electing to use an investment company;
2005–06 GLR 322
(d) in referring to “the management of the activities of the company” in his judgment, the Lieutenant Bailiff impermissibly strayed beyond giving the material words in s.169 of the Law their ordinary meaning;
(e) the rationale behind the availability of the permissible management expenses deduction is to avoid investment companies being put at a disadvantage in comparison with investors holding investments directly;
(f) on the other hand, the entitlement to the deduction is not designed to create a tax advantage for those who hold investments using a company as an intermediary;
(g) the Lieutenant Bailiff ignored the distinction which should properly be made between taking decisions of a managerial nature and those decisions being acted upon. The latter element will not always be part and parcel of “managing the company”;
(h) the effect of the Lieutenant Bailiff’s approach was to equate the computation of an investment company’s assessable income with that of a business, when it was clear that the overall scheme of the Law was to treat the two differently; and
(i) “permissible management expenses” in s.169 of the Law should be construed more restrictively than by equating the position of an investment company with a business. The statutory definition of that phrase has the hallmark of such a restrictive meaning because of the inclusion of the words “wholly and exclusively.”
Our observations on the Administrator’s arguments
17 As we have indicated, the Lieutenant Bailiff did construe the phrase “permissible management expenses” as having a broad meaning. In describing this conclusion in his judgment, the Lieutenant Bailiff equiparated it with the view of Lord Reid in Sun Life Assur. Socy. v. Davidson (2) that the phrase “expenses of management” in s.33(1) of the Income Tax Act 1918 should be given “a fairly wide meaning” ([1958] A.C. at 205).
18 Mr. McMahon submitted that the speeches in the House of Lords in the Sun Life case said nothing to the issue in the instant case, as we are here considering the statutory definition of “permissible management expenses” and not the words “expenses of management.” However, while it is true that in the Sun Life case the phrase under consideration was a different one and there was no equivalent statutory definition of it in the 1918 Act, and also that the Tribunal may have overstated the applicability of that case to the instant one, we do not think that the Lieutenant Bailiff can be faulted for taking the view that the speeches in the Sun Life case, and that of Lord Reid in particular, were helpful, while at the same time reminding himself, as he did, that it was the words of the Income Tax (Guernsey) Law 1975, and not the English statute, that he had to construe.
2005–06 GLR 323
19 What the Lieutenant Bailiff actually said in the material part of his judgment was that the words “laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of managing the company” should be read as “comprehending management in a broad sense, and not in a limited sense.” This brings us to Mr. McMahon’s complaint that the Lieutenant Bailiff failed to give the material words in s.169 their ordinary meaning.
20 This complaint sits rather uneasily with the fact that not one but two meanings of the statutory words have been advanced on the Administrator’s behalf. The first in time (it appears early in the correspondence incorporated in the statement of agreed background facts) seeks to limit their scope to what the Lieutenant Bailiff described as “corporate acts of managing the company” such as (but not necessarily limited to)—
“fees relating to audit, sealing documents and filing fees, and other fees relating to the corporate steps which a company must take from year to year and, especially, that an investment company must take, in order to remain in corporate existence.”
21 The second is encapsulated in a sentence in the written submission made to the Royal Court on behalf of the Administrator and which is in the following terms: “The words should mean no more than the process of taking decisions about the management of the company and not participating in putting those decisions into effect as part of the company’s day-to-day affairs.”
22 In our view, the question as to whether one or other of the interpretations put on the statutory words by the Administrator or the construction chosen by the Tribunal and the Lieutenant Bailiff is correct can only be answered by looking at the relevant words in s.169 in their context—something that the distinguished and highly experienced members of the Tribunal were particularly well equipped to do. When this is done, it is apparent that there is absolutely nothing to indicate that what was intended by the States was merely to allow for the deduction of additional expenses incurred in relation to, as the Lieutenant Bailiff put it, the “corporate acts of managing the company,” or, as the Tribunal described them, items of “statutory expenditure.” Had the legislature wished so to limit the deductions it would and could have used different words which would have made this clear. As it is, there is nothing in the wording to suggest such a limited range of deductions, and both the Tribunal and the Lieutenant Bailiff were right to reject this interpretation.
23 Turning to the Administrator’s alternative construction we cannot find support in the relevant wording in s.169 for his attempt to limit management to “taking decisions about the management.” In the first place, there is no such limitation contained in the relevant wording; in the second, we consider that the words used clearly convey a wider meaning.
2005–06 GLR 324
24 Expenditure “for the purposes of managing” a company is not the same as, and is more extensive in its scope than, expenditure “for the purpose of management.” Furthermore “managing” a company seems to us to mean taking responsibility for the activities of the company and does not, in our view, convey decision making to the exclusion of execution. In the instant case, because the company is an investment company, by definition, “[its] activities consist wholly or mainly in the making of investments.” Therefore items of expenditure laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of managing those activities are deductible, subject only to the limitations and exclusions expressed in the definition in s.169.
25 The Tribunal and the Lieutenant Bailiff concluded—correctly, in our view—that, as expenditure for the purpose of managing the activities of an investment company is not the same thing as expenditure on the purchase or disposal of its assets, the direct expenses of acquiring or disposing of the same are not deductible as “permissible management expenses” and that, therefore, if any such expenses had been included in the claimed deduction of £14,944 it would properly have been disallowed. However, it has not been suggested that any such expense was so included and, looking at the list of items covered by the “investment management fees” set out by the Tribunal, there is nothing that we can see that does not meet the “wholly and exclusively for the purpose of managing the company” requirement.
26 What we have said disposes of Mr. McMahon’s argument that the interpretation put on the definition of deductible expenses by the Tribunal and the Lieutenant Bailiff and endorsed by this court equates the position of investment companies with that of businesses. Even if this were to be the effect of the legislation in a given case, this, of itself, would not displace what we regard as the clear meaning of the material words in s.169. We do, of course, agree with Mr. McMahon, as did the Lieutenant Bailiff, that the requirement in the definition that, to be deductible, an item of expenditure must be a permissible deduction of a business, constitutes a limitation on deductibility, but this did not and does not arise as an issue in the instant case.
27 As to Mr. McMahon’s point that the phrase “permissible management expenses” has the effect of hallmarking a restrictive meaning for the phrase, this was an allusion to a comment by Carnwath, L.J. in the case of Atkinson (Inspector of Taxes) v. Camas PLC (1) on the Sun Life case (2), which reads as follows ([2004] EWCA Civ 541, at para. 26):
“There is nothing in the speeches which supports the view that an activity which is part of [the decision to purchase] ceases to be management, merely because it may also assist in the purchase if that is decided upon—still less if it is not. Unlike the provisions relating
2005–06 GLR 325
to Schedule D expenses, there is no requirement that the expense should be “wholly and exclusively” related to management.”
(See also para. 20 of the judgment of Patten, J. at first instance.)
28 We do not accept Mr. McMahon’s hallmark argument. The “wholly and exclusively” requirement does not colour (or, as the Lieutenant Bailiff put it, does not narrow) the succeeding part of the definition of “permissible management expenses”; it is merely another requirement that has to be met before an item is deductible. Mr. McMahon did not seek to argue before this court or before the Lieutenant Bailiff that if the Tribunal were correct in its interpretation of the scope of the definition, it would be open to the Administrator to seek to challenge its finding of fact that the items of expenditure were laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of managing the taxpayer company.
The taxpayer’s submissions
29 Up to this point, we have not mentioned the arguments advanced to us by Mr. Ferbrache on behalf of the taxpayer. Although attractively put, for the most part they reiterated the points taken in the taxpayer’s favour by the Tribunal and the Lieutenant Bailiff, and, as we have indicated our general acceptance of these when dealing with Mr. McMahon’s arguments, it is not necessary for us substantially to repeat ourselves by going over much the same ground again. There was, however, one point made by Mr. Ferbrache which seemed to us not only to be correct but also to provide powerful support for the taxpayer’s case.
30 There are two exclusions at the end of the definition of “permissible management expenses” in s.169 of the Law. For convenience we repeat the second of them:
“(b) any expense of management which may be taken into account for the purpose of determining the amount of any additional deduction which may be claimable under the provisions of section thirteen of this Law.”
Section 13(1) of the Law reads:
“If in respect of any year of charge, and subject to the provisions of the next succeeding subsection, the owner of any land or building situate in Guernsey proves that the cost to him of the maintenance, repairs, insurance and management of any such land or building, according to the average of the cost to him in the five years preceding that year of charge, has exceeded the amount to be deducted from the annual rental value on account of repairs as provided in section twelve of this Law he shall, in addition to the authorised deductions, be entitled to have the income which would otherwise be assessable
2005–06 GLR 326
in respect of the land or building on which the expenditure has been incurred reduced by the amount of the excess:
Provided that the amount of such reduction shall in no case exceed the difference between the annual rental value of the said land or building and the authorised deduction on account of the repairs thereof.”
31 Mr. Ferbrache’s point was that the exclusions at the end of the definition in s.169 are obviously designed to ensure that investment companies do not receive double allowances, and, in particular, para. (b) prevents an investment company which has invested in land or buildings in Guernsey from receiving double allowances under both ss. 13 and 162 of the Law. However, as he further pointed out, because of the “wholly and exclusively” requirement, that eventuality could only arise if all the items listed in s.13(1) constitute “items of expenditure . . . laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of managing the company.” Therefore the maintenance, repair and insurance of any land or building in which an investment company has invested must constitute part of “the managing of the company,” and expenditure on them must be “items of expenditure as are laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of managing the company.” But these activities go far beyond the scope of what the Tribunal described as “statutory expenditure” and patently involve not only decision-making but also execution. It follows that, in enacting this exclusion, the legislature must have had in its collective mind “management in a broad sense, and not in a limited sense,” to quote once more from the judgment of the Lieutenant Bailiff.
Disposition
32 It follows from the above that, in our opinion, the Royal Court gave the right answer to the question put to it and, as we have said, the Administrator’s appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
2009
Law Report
None
Guernsey Law Reports 2005–06 GLR 314